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Child labor is a persistent phenomenon in many developing countries. In recent years, support has been
growing among rich-country governments and consumer groups for the use of trade policies, such as
product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards, to reduce child labor in poor
countries. In this paper, we discuss research on the long-run implications of such policies. In particular,
we demonstrate that such measures may have the unintended side effect of lowering domestic support
for banning child labor within developing countries, and thus may contribute to the persistence of the
child-labor problem.
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Abstract
Child labor is a persistent phenomenon in many developing countries.
In recent years, support has been growing among rich-country governments
and consumer groups for the use of trade policies, such as product boycotts
and the imposition of international labor standards, to reduce child labor in
poor countries. In this paper, we discuss research on the long-run impli-
cations of such policies. In particular, we demonstrate that such measures
may have the unintended side effect of lowering domestic support for ban-
ning child labor within developing countries, and thus may contribute to
the persistence of the child-labor problem.
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1 Introduction
The eradication of child labor in developing countries is widely viewed as a key
goal for the work of governments and international organizations. Yet despite
many efforts at both the national and international levels, the phenomenon of
child labor has proved remarkably resilient. In 2004, there were still more than
200 million child workers in the world (Edmonds (2008)). A closer look at the
data reveals a lot of heterogeneity across countries. While some countries have
successfully eradicated child labor early on in their development process, in other
cases child labor remains widespread even at fairly high income levels (Doepke
and Zilibotti (2005)).
One reason why child labor is difficult to eradicate is that in countries where
child labor is widespread, political support for child-labor restrictions is often
weak. In our earlier work on the political economy of child labor (Doepke and
Zilibotti (2005)), we argue that the lack of political support for restrictions is due
to economic dependence on child labor. In countries where child labor is unre-
stricted, parents often choose to have many children in order to maximize child-
labor income. High fertility, in turn, implies that families become economically
dependent on child labor and unable to afford sending their children to school.
Such families perceive that they have little to gain from child-labor restrictions.
The lack of domestic support in many developing countries for banning child
labor raises the question of whether the international community should step in
to fight child labor. Indeed, in recent years support has been growing among
rich-country governments and consumer groups for measures such as boycotts
of products that are manufactured using child labor and the imposition of in-
ternational labor standards. However, such proposals have brought consider-
able skepticism from economists, on the grounds that trade sanctions can shift
child employment towards firms producing for local markets that offer worse
working conditions and lower salaries (see, e.g., Edmonds (2008) and Basu and
Zarghamee (2008)).1
In this paper we discuss our ongoing research, based on Doepke and Zilibotti
(2008), on the political-economy implications of the use of trade sanctions in the
fight against child labor. Even if trade sanctions have negative short-term impacts
1Basu and Zarghamee (2008) argue that boycott and trade sanctions may increase child labor.
Their argument is that sanctions tend to depress child wages, and that the response of poor families
depending on child labor to avert extreme poverty may be characterized by strong income effects.
For surveys of the literature on child labor and the issue of international labor standards in particular
see Basu (1999), Edmonds (2008), and the edited volume by Basu, Horn, Roma`n, and Shapiro
(2003). A theoretical review of the implications of child-labor restrictions is given in Doepke and
Krueger (2006). Empirical results on the influence of trade on child labor can be found in Edmonds
and Pavcnik (2005), Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006), and Edmonds, Pavcnik and Topolova (2008).
We discuss this literature in more detail in Doepke and Zilibotti (2008).
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on developing countries (as pointed out by the existing literature), imposing these
could still be worthwhile if they succeed in triggering further political reforms in
the developing countries. From this perspective, a key question is whether trade
sanctions strengthen or, to the contrary, reduce the internal constituency for the
introduction and enforcement of laws against child labor. In particular, do poor
workers turn more or less favorable to a ban on child labor once sanctions are in
place?
In the following analysis, we demonstrate that trade sanctions and interna-
tional labor standards may well reduce domestic support for child-labor regula-
tion. The intuition for this finding is based on the results in Doepke and Zilibotti
(2005), where we show that a worker’s political preferences regarding child-labor
regulations depend on two factors: whether the worker competes with children
in the labor market (i.e., whether his labor supply is a complement to or a sub-
stitute for child labor), and whether the worker’s own children are working. The
group that stands to gain most from introducing child-labor restrictions consists
of workers who compete with children in the labor market, but whose own chil-
dren are not working. Such workers can raise their own wages by restricting other
people’s children from working, without incurring an income loss themselves.
Trade sanctions erode the constituency favoring child-labor restrictions if
they displace working children from an export sector where children compete
with unskilled adults, to a domestic sector where adult and child labor are com-
plementary (as in family-based agriculture). By reducing competition between
children and adult workers, international sanctions undermine the main motive
that leads workers to support child-labor restrictions. In addition, trade sanctions
can lower the return to education, implying that fewer workers will send their
children to school. Once again, this effect shrinks the size of the constituency
that supports child-labor restrictions. Thus, trade policies aimed at reducing child
labor may achieve the opposite of the intended effect and may help perpetuate the
child-labor problem.
In the following sections, we develop this argument using a simplified ver-
sion of the model in Doepke and Zilibotti (2008). In that paper, we provide an
expanded analysis of political transitions and explore the robustness of the find-
ings in more general environments.
2 Model Economy
The model is a two-sector extension of Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) with an ex-
port sector E and a domestic sector D. The economy is populated by overlapping
generations of two-period lived agents. In the first period of their lives, agents
are children, and in the second period they are adult workers who can be either
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skilled or unskilled. Every adult has one child.2 Children may either work or go
to school. Children in school supply no labor, and there is a schooling cost, p that
varies across parents. The cost p is i.i.d. across agents of the same skill group
and over time, and is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [pUl , p
U
h ] for
unskilled parents and [pSl , p
S
h ] for skilled parents, where p
S
h < p
U
l . The variation
in schooling costs may reflect differences in skill transmission within the family,
differences in access to education, and psychological differences in the intrinsic
valuation of education (we do not restrict p to be positive). The assumption that
the cost is lower for skilled families seems natural, as there is more scope for
direct skill transmission, and skilled families are more likely to live in cities with
easy access to schools and to have a strong appreciation of the intrinsic merit of
education. We will maintain the assumption that pSh is sufficiently low that all
skilled parents always choose to educate their children.
When they become adult, children who did not go to school become skilled
with probability pi0, whereas children who went to school become skilled with
probability pi1 > pi0. The education choice is made by parents at the beginning of
the period before knowing which labor regulation prevails in the current period.
We denote the education choice by e ∈ {0, 1}, where e = 1 corresponds to school
and e = 0 to child labor. Adults are altruistic towards their children, in the sense
that the children’s future (adult) utility enters the parent’s utility function. More
precisely, Vhp denotes the utility of an adult skill h ∈ {S,U} with an educational
cost p. Preferences are defined over consumption c and the discounted expected
utility of the children. The utility of an agent with cost p and skill h is then given
by
Vhp = max
e∈{0,1}
{
c+ z
(
pieEpV
′
Sp + (1− pie)EpV ′Up
)}
,
where the maximization is subject to the budget constraint
c+ pe ≤ wh + (1− e)wC .
Here, wh is the wage for skill level h, wC is the wage for working children, e
denotes the education decision, and z ∈ (0, 1) is the altruism factor. The budget
constraint has consumption and, if e = 1, the schooling cost on the expenditure
side. The revenue side is made up of the wage income of the adult plus, if e = 0,
the child-labor income.
The production side consists of two sectors. The output of the domestic sector
D is consumed locally, whereas the output of the export sector E is exported
and exchanged one-for-one with an import good I . Goods D and I are perfect
2In Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), fertility decisions are endogenous. Here, for simplicity, we
assume a constant population.
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substitutes in consumption, Y = Y D + Y I .
The domestic sector D uses unskilled adult labor NDU and child labor N
D
C :
Y D = AD
(
NDU + λ
DNDC
)
,
where λD is the efficiency of children relative to unskilled adults in this sector.
Notice that adult and child labor are perfect substitutes in this sector.3
The export sector E uses skilled adult labor NES , unskilled adult labor N
E
U ,
and child labor NEC :
Y E = AE(NS)α(NEU + λ
ENEC )
1−α,
where λE is the efficiency of children relative to unskilled adults in this sector.
Since the E good needs to be exported, international labor standards (IS) can
affect the use of child labor in this sector. We assume that in the absence of polit-
ical restrictions, the relative productivity of children is the same in both sectors,
λE = λD = λ > 0. However, the foreign countries can impose international la-
bor standards that rule out the use of child labor in theE sector, which amounts to
setting λE = 0. We will now examine how imposing such a standard affects eco-
nomic outcomes as well as political incentives for introducing further restrictions
on child labor.4
3 Labor Standards and the Political Economy of Child Labor
The economy can be in one of three policy regimes: laissez faire (LF), where
child labor is legal in both sectors; international labor standards (IS), where child
labor is legal only in the domestic sector; and a child-labor ban (B), where child
labor is outlawed in both sectors. We first work out the economic ramifications of
the different political regimes, and then turn to political-economy implications.5
3In Doepke and Zilibotti (2008), we consider a similar model where an additional factor enters
(land), and there is competition between children and adults.
4In principle, it would be possible to construct policies that also affect the use of child labor
in the domestic sector, for example by refusing to buy export goods from a country where the
child-labor rate in any sector is above a certain threshold. We discuss this possibility in Doepke
and Zilibotti (2008).
5We focus on a positive rather than normative analysis. In our simplified framework LF is in
fact Pareto optimal, but this hinges on the absence of frictions such as financial market imperfec-
tions, human-capital externalities, and imperfect altruism. See Doepke and Krueger (2006) for a
discussion of child-labor policies from a welfare perspective.
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3.1 Wage Effects of Child-Labor Policies
In a laissez-faire (LF) equilibrium, labor supply adjusts to equate the return to
unskilled labor between the two sectors:
AD ≤ (1− α)AE
(
NLFS
NE,LFU + λN
E,LF
C
)α
. (1)
We focus on parameters ensuring that both sectors operate in equilibrium, so that
(1) holds with equality. Then, the equilibrium unskilled, skilled, and child wages
are given by:
wLFU = A
D, wLFC = λA
D, wLFS = A
Eα
(
AE (1− α)
AD
) 1−α
α
. (2)
Note that all wages depend only on parameters, and not on the skill ratio. The rea-
son is that the linear technology pins down the skill ratio in the export sector, and
this in turns determines the skilled wage. To focus on a case in which trade sanc-
tions have an effect, we assume parameters to be such that NE,LFU + λN
E,LF
C >
NLFU , i.e., the laissez-faire equilibrium has all adults and some of the working
children employed in the export sector.
Next, we study how wages change when policy constraints are imposed. Un-
der international labor standards (IS), the international community refuses to buy
goods produced using children. Thus, children cannot be used in the export sec-
tor, which amounts to setting λE = 0. Under a child-labor ban (which can be
imposed only domestically), the use of children is forbidden in both sectors, im-
plying λE = λD = 0.
In an equilibrium with IS, all adults strictly prefer to continue working in the
export sector, while working children are shifted to the domestic sector, where
they earn the same wage as under LF, i.e., wISC = λAD. The shift of child
labor to the domestic sector increases the scarcity of unskilled labor in the export
sector, which raises the adult unskilled wage and lowers the skilled wage. The
equilibrium adult wages under IS are given by:
wISU = A
E(1− α)
(
N ISS
N ISU
)α
> wLFU , w
IS
S = A
Eα
(
N ISU
N ISS
)1−α
< wLFS .
(3)
Notice that the household income of all unskilled families increases after the in-
troduction of IS (at least initially). This increase reflects the main motive identi-
fied by Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) as a source of political support for child-labor
restrictions: by removing children from the labor market, unskilled workers can
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increase their own labor earnings.
A child-labor ban has the same effect as IS on adult wages (wBU = w
IS
U and
wBS = w
IS
S ), because all adults still prefer working in the export sector. However,
children can no longer earn an income (wBC = 0). Thus, relative to LF, the
ban increases the household income of unskilled workers whose children go to
school, but decreases the household income of unskilled workers whose children
do not go to school. In contrast, relative to IS the ban lowers the household
income of unskilled workers with working children, while the income of those
with children in school stays the same. Thus, if IS are already in place, imposing
further restrictions (i.e., B) on child labor no longer increases anyone’s household
income, at least in the short run. Intuitively, the imposition of IS fully anticipates
the potential wage gains due to B.
This finding is the main reason why in our model the imposition of IS can
lower political support for further child-labor regulation. However, for a full
analysis of political preferences, the dynamic implications of the policies also
have to be taken into account, as we consider below.
3.2 Dynamic Effects of Child Labor Policies
To analyze the impact of child-labor policies on educational incentives and the
skill-distribution of the population, we now solve the dynamic model. Recall that
given our assumptions, all skilled workers educate their children. The optimal
education choice of unskilled workers has a threshold property: unskilled work-
ers with p < pˆ educate their children, while those with p ≥ pˆ do not (and make
their children work instead). The steady-state utilities of skilled and unskilled
workers can be written as:
VUp = max
{
W e=1Up ,W
e=0
Up
}
, VSp = wS−p+z (pi1EpVSp + (1− pi1)EpVUp) ,
where:
W e=1Up = wU − p+ z (pi1EpVSp + (1− pi1)EpVUp) ,
W e=0Up = wU + wC + z (pi0EpVSp + (1− pi0)EpVUp) ,
EpVUp =
pUh − pˆ
pUh − pUl
W e=0Up +
pˆ− pUl
pUh − pUl
W e=1Up .
VUp is the maximum of the value of educating and not educating one’s child for a
given schooling cost p. EpVUp is the expected utility of an unskilled worker be-
fore the schooling cost p is known.6 The threshold pˆ is identified by the condition
6A complete analytical characterization of the steady-state equilibrium as well as the formal
derivations of the results summarized here are provided in Doepke and Zilibotti (2008).
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W e=0Upˆ =W
e=1
Upˆ , leading to
pˆ+ wC = z (pi1 − pi0) (EpVSp − EpVUp) , (4)
where the left-hand side is the opportunity cost of education for a worker with ed-
ucation cost pˆ (consisting of the direct cost and forgone child-labor income) and
the right-hand side is the expected return on education. We assume parameters to
be such that pˆ ∈ (pUl , pUh ).
We can use equation (4) to analyze the impact of child-labor policies on the
incentives for education. Relative to LF, the imposition of IS lowers the frac-
tion of unskilled workers who educate their children: pˆIS < pˆLF . While IS
do not affect wC (which enters the opportunity cost of education), they reduce
EpVSp −EpVUp by decreasing the skill premium. The falling premium weakens
the incentive to educate one’s children.7
The effect of a child-labor ban on education is ambiguous, since on the one
hand B reduces the return to education by lowering EpVSp − EpVUp (similarly
to IS), but on the other hand B also lowers the opportunity cost of education
by setting wC = 0. If z is not too large (and/or if the cost of schooling is not
too large), the effect of the loss of child-labor income on the opportunity cost of
education prevails, and a ban increases investments in education.
The dynamics of the skill composition of the labor force is governed by the
following law of motion:
NS,t+1 = pi1
(
NS,t +
pˆ− pUl
pUh − pUl
(N −NS,t)
)
,
where, recall, NS,t +NU,t = N. In steady state, we have:
NS
N
= pi1
pˆ− pUl
pUh − pUl
(
1− pi1 p
U
h − pˆ
pUh − pUl
)−1
.
The share of skilled workers increases in pi1 and decreases in pˆ. Since (for z not
too large) we have pˆB > pˆLF > pˆIS , we find that B increases and IS decreases
the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers relative to LF.
7This clear-cut result depends on the linear technology of the domestic sector. In Doepke and
Zilibotti (2008), we extend the analysis to the case of decreasing returns to labor in the domestic
sector. There, child-labor earnings fall after the introduction of IS, inducing an offsetting mecha-
nism (lower wC increases the incentives to educate children). Moreover, the result hinges on the
lack of credit constraints. If unskilled workers were credit constrained, an increase in the unskilled
wage might improve their ability to pay for their children’s education.
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3.3 Labor Standards and the Political Support for a Child-Labor Ban
We now move to political incentives, and study how the constituency for the
introduction of a ban on child labor is affected by the external imposition of IS.
Recall that, within each period, parents decide whether to send their children
to school before policy regulation is implemented. For example, if a ban on
child labor is introduced unexpectedly in period t, parents who had decided not
to educate their children cannot change their minds: their children will not get
an education and will remain idle. This timing assumption allows us to keep
the model in the framework of a two-period OLG model while emphasizing that
education decisions have irreversible elements. For instance, a child that has been
kept at work and out of school until age 12 would likely confront a number of
developmental and educational difficulties if it entered school at that age.8
We consider the political incentives regarding two possible policy transitions:
(i) from the LF steady state to a child-labor ban B, and (ii) from the IS steady state
to B. In each case, we want to know which groups would support a ban.
When a child-labor ban is proposed in an economy that is in the LF steady
state, skilled workers tend to oppose the ban, as it would reduce the current skilled
wage. In addition, a ban would induce more unskilled workers to educate their
children, thereby shrinking the future skill premium.9 Unskilled workers who
educate their children tend to support the ban, as it would increase their current
wage, and these workers do not rely on child-labor income. Unskilled work-
ers who do not educate their children oppose the ban: although their own wage
increases, this is more than offset by the loss of child-labor income.10
If, in contrast, a child-labor ban is proposed in an economy where IS are
already in place, the current income of skilled workers would not be affected by a
ban. However, in most cases the imposition of B would still hurt skilled workers
through the general equilibrium effect on future wages. Thus, skilled workers
tend to oppose the ban, but less vigorously than if the initial condition were LF.
Crucially, unskilled workers who educate their children no longer have any
reason to support the imposition of B either, since the ban leaves the adult un-
skilled wage initially unchanged. Moreover, B lowers the future skill premium
8In Doepke and Zilibotti (1995), we present a more general model where agents live for several
periods and where education and fertility decisions are sunk at a particular time in the life cycle.
Here, our timing assumption allows us to capture the same idea in the context of a simpler model.
9It is hard to establish in general the sign of this second effect on political incentives. In most
cases, it reinforces the skilled workers’ opposition to the ban, as skilled workers always educate
their children. One can establish formally that skilled workers oppose the ban as long as z is
sufficiently small. Numerical results illustrate the general case below.
10Once again, the results regarding the political incentives of unskilled workers can be proved
formally for sufficiently small z. Generally, the political economy of the transition from LF to B is
similar to Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), although here we ignore fertility decisions.
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through the general-equilibrium effect on wages. Since these workers educate
their children, the lower future skill premium makes them oppose the ban. Fi-
nally, unskilled workers with working children continue to oppose B, because of
its negative effect on their household income.
In summary, the short-run effects of imposing a child-labor ban once IS are
already in place do not generate any support for the ban, since they cause a loss
of child-labor income for families with working children without any other effect
on current wages. In addition, recall that pˆIS < pLF , implying that the share
of unskilled workers who do not educate their children is larger under IS. Since
this is the group most opposed to a child-labor ban, the constituency against the
ban will be even stronger. Both effects imply that the imposition of IS will lower
domestic political support for B, undermining the prospects for eliminating child
labor in the long run.
3.4 A Numerical Example
The theoretical analysis shows that imposing international labor standards tends
to lower the domestic support for a ban. To illustrate the effects, we construct a
numerical example. We use the following parameter values: AE = 2.9, AD = 1,
α = 0.4, λ = 0.25, pi1 = 0.3, pi0 = 0, z = 0.53, pUl = 0.01, p
U
h = 0.02,
phS = 0, p
l
S = −0.01, N = 1. Under these parameters, in the LF steady state
we have pˆLF = 0.017, implying that two-thirds of the unskilled parents educate
their children. Moreover, these parents form a 52% majority among the adult
workers, including the skilled (NLFS = 0.22 and N
LF
U = 0.78). In contrast, in
the IS steady state we have pˆIS = 0.016, and the unskilled parents who educate
their children no longer form a majority (N ISS = 0.20 and N
IS
U = 0.80).
Transition from LF to B Transition from IS to B
Old SS Transition New SS Old SS Transition New SS
wS 2.663 2.461 1.929 2.659 2.659 1.929
wU 1 1.054 1.24 1.001 1.001 1.24
wC 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0
Table 1: Wages during Transition Path after Introduction of Child-Labor Ban
Table 1 displays the wages under the two steady states (LF and IS) and during
the transitions to B. Consider, first, the transition from LF to a child-labor ban.
Suppose that the ban is imposed at t = 0. In this period, children are withdrawn
from the labor force. As a consequence of the reduction of the unskilled labor
input in the export sector, the adult unskilled wage increases by 5% and the skilled
wage falls by 7.5%. In period t = 1 the wages are as in t = 0, because the
ban was introduced after education decisions were taken at t = 0. However,
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education decisions change at t = 1. Thus, from t = 2 onwards the economy
is in a new steady state, where unskilled wages are 24% higher than in the LF
steady state, and skilled wages are 27% lower. At t = 0, the lifetime utilities
of skilled workers and unskilled workers with working children decline if B is
imposed. In contrast, the lifetime utility of unskilled workers without working
children (who are, recall, the majority of the population) increases. Thus, if LF
is the initial condition, there is a pivotal constituency in favor of the ban.
Consider, next, the transition from IS to B. During the transition (i.e., both
at t = 0 and t = 1) the adult unskilled wage and the skilled wage remain un-
changed. Education decisions change at t = 1, and from t = 2 onwards the
economy is in the new steady state. Here, unskilled wages are 24% higher than
in the IS steady state, and the skilled wages are 27% lower. Starting from the IS
steady state, all adult workers are opposed to the imposition of a child-labor ban
at t = 0. Thus, the imposition of IS eliminates the constituency that otherwise
would have supported the ban B.
Note that the differences in political incentives are not driven by the long-run
effect of the ban (long-run changes in wages are about the same in the two cases).
Instead, what matters is wage changes during the transition. In the transition from
LF to a ban, the adult unskilled wage increases already in period zero. This tilts
the preferences of the unskilled workers without working children in favor of the
policy. In contrast, wages do not change until period t = 2 when IS are already
in place at t = 0. Thus, the only effect on the lifetime utility of the unskilled
workers without working children at t = 0 arises from the future reduction in the
skill premium and the loss of future child-labor income.
4 Conclusions
The theoretical analysis in this paper suggests that actions such as consumer
boycotts, trade sanctions, or the imposition of international labor standards may
undermine the prospects for further child-labor reform in developing countries.
These results partially rely on the assumption that children do not compete with
adult unskilled workers in the domestic sector (i.e., the D technology is linear in
adult and child labor). However, in Doepke and Zilibotti (2008), we show that
much of the basic intuition derived here applies also in the more general case in
which there is competition between child and adult workers in both sectors.
In such an environment, the skill premium varies smoothly in each politi-
cal regime with the relative supply of skilled and unskilled labor. When a ban
is introduced in the model of Doepke and Zilibotti (2008), the unskilled adult
wage always increases and the skilled wage decreases. The size of the wage shift
depends on whether the initial condition is LF or IS. In particular, the effect is
smaller under IS, as the imposition of IS already achieves some of the effects that
10
would be caused by a ban. From a political-economy perspective, the rise in un-
skilled wages implies that unskilled workers who educate their children benefit
economically from the ban even though IS are already in place. Yet, since the size
of the wage shifts depends on the initial regime, the incentive for these workers
to support a ban is weaker under IS than under LF, and may be fully offset by
the long-run implications of the ban. In addition, IS tend to lower the fraction of
unskilled workers who educate their children, which shrinks the constituency that
is at least potentially in favor of banning child labor. Therefore, we still find that
the imposition of international labor standards may weaken domestic support for
a ban, thereby contributing to the persistence of the child-labor problem.
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